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THE CHRISTMAS CROSS: AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION v. CITY OF ST CHARLES
794 F.2D 265 (7TH CIR. 1986)
INTRODUCTION

Cases arising under the establishment clause have presented some of
the most perplexing questions to come before courts.' The Supreme
Court's analyses of these cases are often as perplexing as the questions
presented. Many approaches, through Supreme Court use, are currently
available to lower courts faced with establishment clause issues. However, no approach currently employed by the Supreme Court has simplified the task of a lower court faced with an establishment clause
challenge to a government's display of a religious symbol. Instead, the
many options available have generated a bewildering array of questions
that a lower court could consider in deciding such a case.
In American Civil Liberties Union v. City of St. Charles,2 the Seventh
Circuit applied the gleanings of Supreme Court analyses in determining
whether a city government's cross displayed at Christmas violated the
establishment clause. The court considered the cross's history as a symbol, the effect that the cross was likely to have on observers of the city
display, and the available alternatives to the government sponsored display. The court found that the cross, the principal symbol of Christianity, did not lose its sectarian nature merely because it was displayed
during the Christmas season. The city's cross unconstitutionally conveyed a message of government support for a religious sect.
This Comment will first describe the context in which an analysis of
a religious symbol case must take place. It will set forth the approaches
the Supreme Court has used in establishment clause cases and will suggest how these options apply to a government's display of a religious
symbol. This comment will then show how the Seventh Circuit utilized
each option to produce a multifaceted approach which essentially enlarges the scope of judicial inquiry in establishment clause cases.
BACKGROUND

The first amendment challenges modern government to take no action which influences individual choices about religious ideas or prac1. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973).
2. 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 458 (1986).
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tices. Under the religion clauses, government "shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."'3 Together, the establishment clause and the free exercise clause
4
embody the Framers' goal of religious liberty for all.
Religious liberty requires choices unrestrained by government coercion. 5 The establishment clause prohibits coercive action in favor of a
religious position; the free exercise clause prohibits coercion in hindrance
of a religious position. If the government acts either to advance or hinder the taking of a religious position, it thereby implicitly places matters
of religion into favored and disfavored categories and increases the cost
of choosing the disfavored position over the favored one. 6 Increasing the
cost of choosing the disfavored position diminishes the freedom of all to
explore and make choices in matters of religion.
While the fear of an established national church has subsided in
modem times, the increased power of modern government carries with it
an increased temptation to influence the religious selections of the citi7
zens and to therefore place different costs on different religious choices.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although the first amendment is addressed to Congress, the religion
clauses were made applicable to state and local governments through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (establishment clause);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (free exercise clause).
4. The Framers did not entrust religious liberty to either clause alone. The religion clauses are
"co-guarantors" of individual religious liberty. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
256 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Since the purpose of the religion clauses was "to state an
objective, not to write a statute," Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970), the modern Court
has stated that the establishment clause prohibits government interference with individual freedom
of religion. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985). Justice Rehnquist, however, maintains that
the Framers intended the establishment clause to prohibit only establishing a national church and
government discrimination between sects, not mere interference. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
5. Although the allocation of power between state and federal government was important to
the drafting of the first amendment, the first principal concern of the Framers was the prevention of
religious coercion. For a discussion of the foundations of this proposition and its ramifications, see
generally McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1. Governmental restraint
on religious liberty is particularly dangerous because "[t]hose who begin coercive elimination of
dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters." Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 54-55 n.39 (quoting
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943)) (striking a state required "moment of silence"
in public classrooms; Barnette invalidated compulsory flag saluting in the classroom).
6. When government supports a particular religious belief, religious minorities suffer an "indirect coercive pressure" to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion. Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 702 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431
(1962)). However, government classification along religious lines is not always unconstitutional.
The free exercise clause sometimes requires such classification. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that state unemployment benefits made available to those not willing to
work on Sunday, must be given to a worker who was not willing to work on Saturday, her Sabbath).
7. More than a quarter of a century ago, the Court perceived that its task was to translate the
generalities of the eighteenth century Bill of Rights "into concrete restraints on officials dealing with
the problems of the twentieth century." Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). The
Court acknowledged the closer integration of society and the increased strength of modern government. Id.

CHRISTMAS CROSS

The establishment and free exercise clauses urge government to avoid
that temptation. Although it may be impossible for all government action to be neutral in relation to all religious matters,8 the goal of noninfluence-of religious liberty for all-should remain the guiding principle
of modern courts.
While both religion clauses are directed to the same goal, the modern Supreme Court has recognized that either clause, "if expanded to a
logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."9 The government
might provide for free exercise to such an excessive extent that it runs
afoul of the establishment clause. '0 The Court is not anxious to "locate"
cases in the thorny extremes of either clause. Instead, the Court begins
its analysis by identifying which religion clause is most obviously
implicated.1
If the Court identifies a case as a free exercise clause case, it will
apply a strict scrutiny analysis to the challenged action. The Court will
ask whether the government action burdens the exercise of religion. If it
does, the Court will then ask whether the government has a compelling
interest that justifies the action and whether that interest can be achieved
by less restrictive means. Unless the government action is justified as the
least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest, the action will
be declared unconstitutional.1 2 This is virtually the same analysis used
when the government allegedly violates other fundamental rights such as
free speech, 1 3 and the right to privacy.1 4 When faced with free exercise
problems, the lower courts at least can feel confident that they know
what test to apply and which questions to ask.
8. Total separation between church and state is not possible in any absolute sense. Lynch, 465
U.S. at 672 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) and upholding a city sponsored
creche display); see, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 670 ("the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an
involvement of sorts"). While government neutrality is certainly called for, Grand Rapids School
Dist. v. Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 3222 (1985), total neutrality may be as impossible to achieve as total
separation between church and state.
9. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69.
10. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14-2 to 14-4, at 813-23
(1978). In Tribe's opinion, where the two clauses conflict, a "zone of permissible accommodation"
should be carved out of the establishment clause prohibition so that government may "accommodate
its institutions and programs to the religious interests of the people." Id. § 14-4, at 819-23. The
danger in this approach is that government could all too easily defer to the interests of the majority
and therefore stray from the purpose of the establishment clause-to place religious freedom beyond
the reach of majority vote. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
11. See McConnell, supra note 5, at 5. McConnell argues against this initial classification and
proposes questions that should be asked of cases regardless of the clause involved. Id. at 35-39.
12. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (invalidating a state's denial of unemployment benefits to a worker who felt religiously compelled to quit his job in weapons production).
13. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981); Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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If the Court categorizes the problem before it as an establishment
clause case, however, the appropriate method of analysis is far less settled. In recent years, no single test, framework for analysis, or set of
questions has dominated establishment clause cases in the manner that
strict scrutiny has dominated free exercise cases. Lower courts faced
with an establishment clause case can feel far less confident that they are
asking the questions which the Supreme Court would ask.15
Such insecurity has not always characterized establishment clause
decisionmaking. In 1971, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, t6 the Supreme Court
compressed its previous establishment clause decisions into a tripartite
test: (1) government action must have a secular purpose, (2) the principal
or primary effect of government action must neither advance nor inhibit
religion, and (3) the action must not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. 17 The Lemon test was aimed at ending
the evils of government sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement in religious activity.18 The Court emphasized that the first
amendment prohibited government action "respecting" an establishment
of religion, that is, action that "could lead" to a state established religion. 19 While the Lemon Court acknowledged the difficulty of identifying a government action "respecting" an establishment of religion, the
Court nevertheless perceived its new formulation as an applicable begin'20
ning to "every analysis in this area."
The uniformity of analysis which the Lemon decision appeared to
promise has not been realized. Commentators have described the
Court's application of the Lemon test to various establishment clause
cases as "mystifying" 2' and a "patchwork of ad hoc decisions." '2 2 The
15. See Van Zandt v. Thompson, 649 F. Supp. 583, 589 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Greater Houston
Chapter of A.C.L.U. v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 233 (S.D. Tex. 1984). The Eckels court was
impelled by the Supreme Court's random approach to establishment clause analysis to evaluate the
Latin crosses and the Star of David displayed in a public park under all the tests "presently thought
to be employed" by the Supreme Court. Id. Two years later, the Van Zandt court remarked that
current establishment clause law is "a rather muddled doctrinal path for lower courts to follow."
649 F. Supp. at 589. The court then analyzed a prayer room established in the state capitol building
under three different approaches. Id. at 589-92.
16. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking state provided supplemental salaries for teachers in parochial

schools).
17. Id. at 612-13. The Court developed its Lemon formulations from several major cases in-

cluding: Walz, 397 U.S. 664 (tax exemptions for religious organizations); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks supplied to church schools); Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (bible reading in
public schools); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (release time from school for religious instruction); and Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (public funds expended for transportation to parochial schools).
18. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).
19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Devins, Religious Symbols and the Establishment Clause, 27 J. CHURCH & ST. 19, 21
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Court itself found the test unnecessary for the establishment clause analysis in Larson v. Valente. 23 In Larson, the Court struck down a Minnesota statute that required religious organizations which solicited more
than fifty per cent of their funds from nonmembers to register and report
to the state. 24 The Court found that the statute granted a denominational preference specifically forbidden by the establishment clause and
25
therefore the statute had to be tested under a strict scrutiny standard.
26
The Lemon test was also deemed unnecessary in Marsh v. Chambers,
where the Court held that Nebraska's use of chaplains in the state legislature did not violate the establishment clause because a long tradition supported such practices. As these cases illustrate, no longer must every
establishment clause analysis begin with the Lemon criteria; rather, the
test is now only one signpost, 27 helpful in pointing to particular evils to
be avoided.
The sole establishment clause "rule" of analysis appears to be that
"no fixed, per se rule can be framed."'2 8 Courts are faced with case by
case analysis of whether the establishment clause's "blurred, indistinct,
and variable barrier" 29 has been breached. At leave five alternatives or
supplements to the Lemon test are available to lower courts confronting
32
3
religion issues: 30 the historical approach, 1 the strict scrutiny analysis,
(1985). Devins criticizes the Court's Lynch decision for its failure to clarify analytical standards
applicable to establishment clause cases. Devins finds a new trend, "namely, that government may
benefit religion in an even or uneven manner provided that such government benefits do not limit the
government's rule-making authority." Id. at 45 (emphasis in original). The Jaffree decision, invalidating Alabama's schooltime moment of silence statute, however, does not fit this identified trend.
Instead, it supports Devins' first assertion that the cases are mystifying. (The Jaffree decision was
subsequent to the Devins article.) See also Lynch v. Donnelly: Has the Lemon Test Soured?, 19
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 133, 164, 168 (1985) (attributing the inconsistency of the decisions to both the
complexity of the establishment clause prohibition and the inflexibility of the Lemon test and proposing a test based upon categories similar to those in equal protection analysis).
22. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 495, 498 (1986). Marshall describes the general confusion in establishment clause
analysis and shows how the Court has turned to a symbolic understanding, as opposed to a substantive understanding, of the establishment clause. The symbolic understanding seeks to eliminate the
perception of improper government action rather than certain types of government involvement with
religion. Id.
23. 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982). The statute stricken was obviously aimed at limiting the activities
of the members of the Unification Church, the "Moonies." Id. at 255.
24. Id. at 252.
25. Id. at 246.
26. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
27. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (upholding tax deductions for parents of parochial school children).
28. Lynch, 485 U.S. at 678.
29. Id. at 679 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614).
30. A sixth possible alternative approach, accommodation analysis, has not as yet been developed by the Court. The Court's references to government accommodation to religion, which began
in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952), do not propose questions to be asked. Instead,
accommodation is a conclusory label, McConnell, supra note 5, at 4, which reflects the impossibility
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Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, 33 Justice Brennan's "whether secular means are available" inquiry, 34 and the comparative benefits analysis
3
used in Lynch v. Donnelley. "
a. HistoricalApproach
Historical inquiry has been a part of establishment clause analysis
for many years. 36 Prior to Lemon, Sunday closing laws were examined in
light of their history, 37 as were tax exemptions for religious organizations. 38 After Lemon, in Marsh,39 the Court used a historical analysis
rather than the three part Lemon test in upholding a state's practice of
paying chaplains to open legislative sessions with prayers. It found that
the practice had been acceptable to the First Congress and was "part of
the fabric of our society." 4 In Marsh, as in the pre-Lemon cases, the
Court sought out the history of the particular practice at issue.
In Lynch, however, the Court engaged in a broader historical analy4
1
sis and used it to supplement the Lemon test. The Court found that a
city's creche display was constitutionally permissible because, in part, the
city had "taken note of a significant historical religious event long celebrated in the Western World."'42 The proper focus for evaluating the
creche was in the context of a season of celebration acknowledged by the
of achieving complete separation between government and religion. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Any statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an 'accommodation' of free exercise rights."). See also Van Zandt v. Thompson, 649 F. Supp. 583, 592 (N.D. Ill.
1986). Nevertheless, two commentators claim to have identified a two factor accommodation
inquiry:
The first is whether the state is genuinely removing obstacles to free exercise ... or whether
the state is merely supplementing opportunities which already exist. The second factor is
whether the state facilitates free exercise by providing services secular and neutral in themselves... or whether the state becomes directly involved in religious activity ....
Dorsen & Sims, The Nativity Scene Case: An Errorof Judgment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 837, 862-63.
The "accommodation approach" will not be further developed in this Comment.
31. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791-92.
32. Larson, 456 U.S. at 244-46.
33. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-92 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see generally Note, Wallace v. Jaffree: The Lemon Test Sweetened, 22 Hous. L. REV.
1273 (1985) (discussing the advantages of endorsement analysis).
34. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 699, 704-05 n.l 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459
U.S. 116, 124 (1982); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
35. 465 U.S. at 681-83. This approach compares the benefit to religion in the case at hand with
the benefits allowed in previous Supreme Court decisions.
36. See generally Lynch, 465 U.S. at 718-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961).
38. Walz, 397 U.S. at 678.
39. 463 U.S. at 790.
40. Id. at 792.
41. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 719 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (preferring an analysis limited to the
history of the particular practice under review).
42. Id. at 680.
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people, governments, and courts for two centuries. 43 The history of the
creche, as a particular item, did not concern the Court.
Together, Lynch and Marsh stand as strong support for the constitutionality of practices that have become a tradition to the majority of citizens. Since symbols gain their meaning from widespread accepted use,
historical analysis tends to give greater weight to the beliefs of the majority, whose symbols appear to be more traditional. The rights of the minority to be free from this "traditional" religious coercion become
slimmer as the historical analysis broadens to allow the government to
display symbols that are merely linked to some tradition of the Western
World.
b. Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny became an alternative to the Lemon test in Larson v.
Valente. 44 The Larson Court was confronted with an establishment
clause claim; members of the Unification Church challenged a Minnesota
statute that exempted certain religious organizations from registering
and reporting under a charitable solicitations act.4 5 The Court found that
the challenged statute involved a denominational preference, forbidden
by the establishment clause, and that the Lemon test was not intended to
apply to such cases. 46 Instead, a strict scrutiny test was applied. Under
Larson, a government action which gives preference to some religious
denominations over others must be invalidated "unless it is justified by a
compelling governmental interest, and unless it is closely fitted to further
that interest."'4 7 While strict scrutiny places the burden of justification
on a government, it applies only to establishment clause cases which evidence an "express design"4 8 to favor or hinder selected denominations.
43. Id. at 686. Justice Brennan states that "the historical record points in precisely the opposite
direction." Id. at 720 (dissenting opinion). See also id. at 720-25 (the historical developments of
Christmas and displays of nativity scenes).
44. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). The Court also considered the Lemon analysis although it stated that
this was not necessary to the disposition of the case. Id. at 252.
45. Id. at 231-32.
46. Id. at 252. The Court observed that denominational preference is "inextricably connected
with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 245. While the Court's observation
is undoubtedly true, "establishments" of other types are also inextricably tied to the free exercise of
religion because "establishments" necessarily tend to interfere with free choice in religious matters.
See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
47. Id. at 247 (citations omitted). In Larson, the Court assumed arguendothat the state had a
compelling interest in protecting citizens from abusive solicitation but found that the statute at issue
was not closely fitted to further that interest. Id. at 248. The Court's establishment clause strict
scrutiny test does not ask whether a burden is placed upon religious exercise. Thus, it differs from
the free exercise strict scrutiny discussed earlier. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
48. Larson, 456 U.S. at 255. "The premise for the Court's [strict scrutiny] standard is that the
challenged provision is a deliberate and explicit legislative preference for some religious denomina-
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Strict scrutiny is of limited use in religious symbol cases. In Lynch,
the Court noted that the city's nativity scene was not patently discriminatory "in the sense contemplated by Larson."' 49 If a display of the
Christ child does not command strict scrutiny, then it is likely that no
other religious symbol would require strict scrutiny either. However, the
underlying message of Larson, that religious favoritism requires stricter
application of the establishment clause prohibition, should be a rationale
available to courts deciding symbol cases.
c.

The Endorsement Test

Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, proposed in her concurrence
in Lynch, is a clarification or refinement or the Lemon test. 50 It essentially translates the Lemon questions into phrases more appropriate to
symbolic interpretation, 5 1 and is therefore more applicable to symbol
cases. The endorsement test asks "whether government's actual purpose
is to endorse or disapprove of religion," '5 2 and whether "the practice
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval."' 53 The endorsement test is gradually gaining the acceptance of a
54
majority of the Court.
The endorsement test is aimed at striking out the evil caused when a
government sends a message that nonadherents to a religion are outsiders
to the political community, or that adherents are insiders to the community. 55 Both the subjective and objective components of the government
message must be examined. 56 Whether a message of endorsement is retions over others." Id. at 260 (White, J., dissenting). The Lemon test, on the other hand, is intended
to apply to government practices that uniformly benefit all religions. Id. at 252. The Court appears
to have forgotten that the vast area of controversy lies between express, intentional favoritism and

uniform benefits to all religion.
49. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 n.13 (relating that the court of appeals' use of strict scrutiny was

incorrect).
50. Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's proposal revives an approach
used before the Lemon test was developed. The Court first spoke of actions which appeared to
convey "governmental endorsement" of religion as forbidden by the establishment clause in Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (ending practice of leading public school students in non-denominational prayer composed by school authorities).
51. For a thorough discussion of symbolic interpretation in establishment clause cases see generally Marshall, supra note 22.

52. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. The endorsement test's first question was incorporated into the Lemon analysis used in
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (asking whether Alabama's actual purpose was to endorse school
prayer). The second endorsement question was asked in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S.
Ct. 3216, 3226 (1985) (whether programs of teacher-sharing between public and sectarian schools
conveyed a message of government endorsement of religion).
55. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 690.
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ceived is a legal question to be answered by judges interpreting social
facts.5 7 Judges are to ask: Would an objective observer fairly understand
this practice to convey a message of government endorsement of
58
religion?
The objective observer point of view has been criticized as the view
of the "reasonable Christian man," because it appears to take into account only the perceptions of the public at large. 59 Unusually devout
Christians, like non-Christians, may receive a message of government endorsement from a practice that would not offend the public at large. The
objective observer has also been likened to and contrasted with the "average person" in obscenity law.6° The problematic questions are the same
no matter which label is applied: How does one imagine a person who is
objective, average, or reasonable in regard to religion? Should one simply rely on the point of view of the majority?
Apparently, the endorsement test invites a judge to take either the
point of view of a "reasonable" nonadherent or devoted minority, or the
point of view of the "reasonable" majority. 61 While the Lynch Court did
not explicitly subject the nativity scene to the endorsement test, it considered the message conveyed by the display: "The display engenders a
'6 2
friendly community spirit of goodwill in keeping with the season."
Since non-Christians are less likely to have received a friendly message of
community spirit from the nativity scene, the Court's statement strongly
57. Id. at 694. The objective observer is assumed to be familiar with the demands of the free
exercise clause. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 76, 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. Dorsen & Sims, supra note 30, at 860.
60. The "average person" obscenity test asks whether, according to contemporary community
standards, the allegedly obscene material appeals to prurient interests. Jaffee, 472 U.S. at 76
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). Professor Marshall
believes that although the objective observer test remains incomprehensible, it is, at least, more accurately drawn by the analogy to the reasonable person in obscenity law because both tests concern
"the community's irrational response to a particular stimulus." Marshall, supra note 22, at 536-37.
While both tests depend upon irrational or subjective responses, the analogy is not accurately drawn.
The fault lies in the fact that Justice O'Connor's objective observer answers the constitutional question, while the average person in obscenity law merely presents or narrows constitutional issues: If
the objective observer in establishment clause analysis perceives the government action as an endorsement of religion, the constitutional question is answered because all government endorsement
of religion is prohibited. On the other hand, if the average person in obscenity analysis perceives the
material as obscene, the constitutional question is not answered because obscene material is not
prohibited by the Constitution. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 561 (1969) (individuals
cannot be prohibited from possessing obscene materials in their homes). For a general discussion of
tests in obscenity law see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-16, at 658-70 (1978).

61. Marshall, supra note 22, at 535. Professor Marshall finds that in the Lynch decision Justice
Blackmun took the position of the religiously sensitive Christian, Justice Brennan adopted the view
of a minority observer, and Justice O'Connor took the view of the community in general. Id. at 535
n.235.
62. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685.
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implies a majoritarian point of view. Justice Brennan, on the other hand,
stated in dissent that the creche will remind "the average observer of the
religious roots of the celebration,"' 63 and will convey a message to minority groups "that their views are not similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled to public support." 64 The endorsement test's objective
observer point of view has not been well defined.
d. Availability of Secular Means
Justice Brennan has consistently urged application of the test he
proposed in his concurrence in Abington School District v. Schempp. 65
Nearly twenty years after Schempp, his proposed question, whether secular means are available to serve the government objective, was asked by
the Court in Larkin v. Grendel's Den 66 as part of the purpose prong of
the Lemon test. The Court found that the Massachusetts statute under
review, which vested religious bodies with veto power over liquor
licenses, had a secular purpose. However, since this purpose could be
accomplished by secular means, 67 the statute was invalid.
The next term, the Court did not apply Justice Brennan's inquiry to
the Lynch creche. In a footnote, the Court declared that the question
was irrelevant. 68 "A" secular purpose was all that was needed to keep
the city's creche display. 69 Lower courts are left with little to guide them
in determining what circumstances will trigger "the secular means available" question. In theory, at least, this inquiry is still available to lower
courts deciding symbol cases distinguishable from Lynch.
Government displays of religious symbols to accomplish celebratory
purposes would almost certainly, fail to satisfy the requirement of this
question. Jesus, Mary, and Joseph could be replaced by Santa and his
elves; Latin crosses could be replaced by memorial wreaths or secular
sculpture. Justice Brennan's question would not, however, kill religious
63. Id. at 713 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated a three part test:
"Equally the Constitution enjoins those involvements of religious with secular institutions which
(a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental
ends where secular means would suffice." Id.
66. 459 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1982).
67. The Court suggested other means by which the spiritual, cultural, and educational centers
could be protected from the "hurly-burly" of liquor outlets, such as an absolute ban on liquor outlets
within a certain distance from churches, schools, and hospitals. Id.
68. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.7. Justice Brennan responded, "It seems the Court is willing to
alter its analysis from Term to Term in order to suit its preferred results." Id. at 699 n.4 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
69. Id. at 681.
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symbolism. 70 Instead, religious symbols could still be sponsored by individuals or religious groups. A proliferation or at least a greater interest
in religious symbols might,1 in fact, result from applying the "secular
7
means available" question.
e.

Comparative Benefits

The comparative benefits approach was most clearly applied in
Lynch. There, the Court compared the benefit to religion of the city's
creche display with the benefits to religion which were upheld or invalidated in prior decisions. 72 The creche was no more beneficial to religion
than such things as supplying textbooks to parochial schoolchildren, legislative prayers, or Sunday closing laws. 7 3 The creche was less beneficial
than liquor license veto power and religious instruction in public school
rooms. 74 Therefore, the creche did not benefit or advance religion in an
unconstitutional sense.
The comparative benefits approach, undertaken as part of the effect
prong of the Lemon test, is a very broad method of analysis. As the
Court acknowledged, it requires an "elusive" and "difficult" comparison
of the benefits conferred to religion in previous cases. 75 As more cases
are decided, it necessarily invites more comparisons.
The comparative benefits approach, although difficult, may prove to
be a helpful method for lower courts deciding establishment clause cases
of first impression. However, in the context of religious symbol cases, the
availability of the Lynch decision and the difficulty of the comparative
benefits approach may combine to serve as an invitation to courts to simply compare the benefit of the symbol at issue with the benefit found
constitutional in Lynch. 76 Thus, what started as a very broad approach
70. Cf Crabb, Religious Symbols. American Traditions and the Constitution, 1984 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 509, 546. Crabb argues that a "commemoration test" is needed to insure that "symbolic nakedness" does not result from requiring governments to justify their uses of religious symbols when
the use of non-religious symbols would suffice. Id. at 546-49. The proposed commemoration test
would ask both whether the symbol itself and its use by government is linked to an established
American or local tradition. Id. at 549.
71. For example, after the City of St. Charles was enjoined from displaying the cross on its fire
station, the Mayor of St. Charles stated that he expected the residents to respond to the injunction by
lighting crosses on private buildings throughout the town. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 18, 1986, § 1, at
1, col. 2.
72. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-83.
73. Id. at 681-82.
74. Id. at 683.
75. Id. at 681.
76. The temptation to thus limit symbol analysis to Lynch is illustrated by Frederick Schauer's

statement, "In interpretive arenas below the Supreme Court, one good quote is worth a hundred
clever analyses of the holding." Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 682, 683 (1986).
The entire comparative benefits approach may be called into question if one subscribes to Jerome
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may turn out to be very narrowly applied by the lower courts. 77
The Lemon test and all five of the above options have been employed
to some degree by the Supreme Court. These approaches are currently
available to lower courts deciding establishment clause cases. A religious
symbol case may call for a strict Lemon analysis, a solely historical analysis, or some combination of approaches. Application of the "wrong
test" or even application of the "right test" without supplements can lead
to Supreme Court reversal. 78 One district court recently applied the
Lemon test, the historical approach, and strict scrutiny in an effort to
conform to Supreme Court methods. "Fortunately," the court stated,
the three crosses and the Star of David displayed by the county government were unconstitutional under each test. 79 The unpredictability of
Supreme Court analyses provides lower courts with a variety of choices
that may be woven into patterns of analyses which reach well beyond the
questions posed by the Lemon test. Currently, only one rule may be
stated with certainty-there is no one rule.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a. Facts of the Case
Each year the City of St. Charles, Illinois sponsors a display of
Christmas lights. 80 The city's main thoroughfares and downtown public
buildings, especially those located in the six acre municipal complex, are
decorated with lighted Christmas trees, wreaths, snowmen, Santa
Clauses, and other traditional Christmas symbols. The city has continued this practice for well over fifteen years.
In 1969, the volunteer firemen decided to include the fire station in
the light display. The firemen decorated the station's thirty-five foot teleFrank's argument that courts do not actually rely on precedents because it is impossible to tell what
was actually decided in earlier cases. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 159-71 (1970).
77. In Justice Brennan's dissent, he stated that the Lynch decision was narrow, largely turning
on the particular holiday context of the creche, and leaving open the question of whether government displays of other symbols, such as a cross, are constitutional. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 695 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justice Brennan strongly implies that the facts of Lynch will be easy to distinguish
from the facts of future cases. The point that Justice Brennan misses is that the cases the majority
relied on were also easily distinguishable from Lynch but were no less easily brought under the broad
sweep of the comparative benefits approach.
78. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672, 687 n.13 (the district court correctly chose the Lemon test
but apparently should have supplemented it with a historical inquiry; the court of appeals incorrectly
chose the strict scrutiny test); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (the lower courts applied the Lemon test but should have used historical analysis instead).
79. Greater Houston Chapter of A.C.L.U. v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 233 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
80. St. Charles is located in the valley of the Fox River. The award winning light display
reflects off the river and can be seen for miles. A.C.L.U. v. City of St. Charles, 622 F. Supp. 1542,
1543 (N.D. Il1. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 458 (1986).
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vision antenna and eighteen foot radio antenna crossbar with white
lights, forming a Latin cross. The firemen maintained the lights on their
own time, at their own expense. The city, however, paid for the electricity used until 1984 when several citizens questioned the expenditure.
This issue was resolved when a private citizen volunteered to pay for all
electricity used by the cross.8 ' The city kept records of the electricity
used, amount spent, and amount to be reimbursed.
Shortly before the 1985 Christmas season, two residents of St.
Charles 82 and the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois (A.C.L.U.)
sued the city and its mayor to enjoin the lighting of the cross. The individual plaintiffs stated that they were so offended by the illuminated
cross that they had to detour from their normal routes within the city in
order to avoid it. The A.C.L.U. and the individual plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the cross violated the Constitution.
Upon the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, the district
court held that the city's cross display was a violation of the establishment clause.8 3 The preliminary injunction was issued, and the city appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner
writing for the court, affirmed the district court's order. 84
b.

Reasoning of the District Court

The district court began its discussion by acknowledging that the
Lemon test was used by the Supreme Court in Lynch and by setting forth
the three parts of the Lemon test. 85 The court then analyzed the city's
cross display under the purpose, effect, and entanglement prongs of the
test.
The court proposed to test the city's purpose by the standard stated
in Lynch: whether the action "was motivated wholly by religious considerations. ' ' 86 However, the court's main concern was whether the city's
display was "sufficiently secular" 87 to pass the Lemon purpose test. It
found that the city's purpose was celebratory, but could not conclude
that a celebratory purpose, "no matter how religiously thematic the sym81. The electricity cost for the 1984 season was $23.65. Id. at 1544.
82. The two residents were members of the A.C.L.U.: one was a Methodist and the other a
nonbeliever. 794 F.2d at 267.
83. 622 F. Supp. at 1547.
84. 794 F.2d at 276.
85. 622 F. Supp. at 1544-45. Cf.Greater Houston Chapter of A.C.L.U. v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp.
222 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (applying the Lemon test, historical analysis, and strict scrutiny to invalidate
the display of three crosses and a Star of David in a public park).
86. 622 F. Supp. at 1545 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680). Similar language appears in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) ("entirely motivated").
87. 622 F. Supp. at 1545.
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bol, ' '8 8 sufficed to pass the secular purpose test. The court accepted that
Justice Brennan's dissent in Lynch cast doubt on the constitutionality of
a cross display.8 9 The court contrasted the tradition of a creche at
Christmas with the tradition of a cross on a building, which generally
serves the purpose of identifying a church. Finally, the court left the
purpose inquiry unresolved.
The effect prong of the Lemon test was analyzed under Justice
O'Connor's endorsement inquiry: whether the cross display had the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement of religion.
The court was convinced that Christians received a "unique and exclusive benefit of public recognition and approval of their views," 90 from the
cross display. Because the cross was not a traditional Christmas symbol,
neither the context of Christmas nor the city's overall display negated the
message of endorsement. The entanglement prong of the Lemon test was
not discussed at length. The court simply noted that the record keeping
done by the city was much less than the city involvement approved in
92
Lynch. 9 1 The injunction was issued on the strength of these findings.
c. Reasoning of the Seventh Circuit
The first issue for the circuit court was whether the plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the city's cross display. 93 The plaintiffs did not
claim to have standing based on expenditure of their tax money for the
cross display. Rather, they alleged that their rights to use the public
streets had been curtailed because they had to detour from their normal
routes in order to avoid the cross. Although the cost to the plaintiffs was
slight, the court found that it served to validate the existence of their
distress and to distinguish them from others objecting to the display. 94
After finding that standing was proper, the court emphasized that
88. Id. In Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court expressly considered
the "degree of religiosity" in deciding that a creche could remain on federal parkland with certain
restrictions such as an explanatory plaque. The Supreme Court has not spoken in terms of degrees
of religiosity. However, the comparative benefits approach may implicitly include an appraisal of
this factor.
89. 622 F. Supp. at 1545 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 695 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)). The court
also cited A.C.L.U. v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d 1098, 1110 (1 1th Cir. 1983),
for the proposition that the cross is universally regarded as a Christian symbol.
90. 622 F. Supp. at 1546 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
91. 622 F. Supp. at 1547.
92. 622 F. Supp. at 1546. The court quoted Justice O'Connor's statement that endorsement is a
legal question based on judicial interpretation of social facts. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
93. 794 F.2d at 267. The district court did not treat standing as an issue but related the basis
for the plaintiffs' standing in a footnote. See 622 F. Supp. at 1542 n.l.
94. 794 F.2d at 268-69. The court noted that a thorough discussion of standing, reaching the
same result, was contained in Rabun County, 698 F.2d at 1102-09.
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the case was at hand for preliminary relief based upon an incomplete
record. The court declared that the injunction was properly granted
(1) if the plaintiffs were more likely to win at the trial on the merits, and
(2) if the injury to the plaintiffs and others like them from denial of the
injunction outweighed the injury to the defendants and others supporting
them under the injunction. 95
In deciding whether the plaintiffs were likely to win at trial, the
court first set forth the original purpose for the establishment clause: "to
secure the religious liberties of those people who did not belong to
whatever denomination might have become the national church."'96 The
court then briefly related a history of expanding application of the establishment clause. The court characterized the modem Supreme Court
treatment as a directive to strike down all government actions which
have a primary or principal effect of promoting religion as a whole or
97
certain religious groups.
The Seventh Circuit then examined the effect of the cross display.
The court found that the cross is the principal symbol of Christianity and
that the city's display conveyed a message of government support for
Christianity. The court was particularly troubled by the sectarianism inherent in the Latin cross. The court reasoned that sectarian displays
should be subject to a stricter application of the establishment clause pro98
hibition because they are closer to the original targets of the clause.
The court distinguished the city's cross from other Christian symbols, which clearly have lost their religious connotations for most people, 99 and the creche display upheld in Lynch, which was a "mixed
case."'100 Although the court conceded that the Lynch creche still had an
effect of promoting Christianity, and indeed brought Christianity back
into Christmas, the Seventh Circuit stated that "the Supreme Court may
have felt that the effect [of promoting Christianity] was not great enough
95. 794 F.2d at 269.
96. Id. at 270.
97. Id. In support of this statement, the court cited the portion of the Lemon opinion that sets
forth the familiar three part test, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The court offered Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39 (1980), in which the Supreme Court invalidated a statute requiring the ten commandments to be
posted in public classrooms, as an example of the standard to be applied in the present case. 794
F.2d at 270. However, the Stone statute was struck down on religious purpose grounds alone. See
Stone, 449 U.S. at 42-43.
98. 794 F.2d at 271. The court did not elaborate on what a stricter application of the establishment clause might be. The "stricter application" must therefore be discerned from what the court
found and did. See infra text accompanying note 119.
99. 794 F.2d at 271. Christmas symbols which the court found have lost their religious meaning include holly wreaths, the Christmas tree, and the five-pointed star. Id.
100. 794 F.2d at 272. The creche is a "mixed case" in the sense that in the context of a Christmas display it may have both secular and religious connotations.
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to warrant the mutilation of traditional Christmas displays."'' 1 Since
the cross is not a traditional Christmas symbol, its removal would not
mutilate tradition. The court relied heavily on the history of the cross
and contrasted the death and resurrection the cross brings to mind with
the birth and childhood the creche brings to mind.
Next, the court considered the cross in the context of the city's overall display. The cross's prominent place in the display and its integration
only in the sense that it was another lighted structure, did not alter the
cross's primary status as a symbol of Christianity rather than Christmas.
The court concluded that the amount of support given to Christianity,
while not great, was greater than that given by the Lynch creche
02
display. 1
Finally, the court balanced the harms likely to result from issuing an
injunction and from not issuing an injunction. The court found that
irreparable harm would be done not only to the plaintiffs but also to
society if an injunction was not granted. The harm was identified as "an
erosion of religious liberties. ' 10 3 The court also found that no
probability of irreparable harm to the defendants or the Christian residents of the city would result from an injunction. The court reasoned
that if the cross was just another Christmas symbol, as the city maintained it was, then it could be replaced with some other symbol. On the
other hand, if the cross was both a secular and religious symbol, giving
pleasure to Christians, then the same pleasure was available by displaying the cross on a nearby private building volunteered for this purpose.
Under these circumstances, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the order granting the preliminary injunction.
101. Id.
102. The court further supported its decision that the plaintiffs were likely to win at trial by
citing other cases in which the display of a cross has been held unconstitutional: Friedman v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (invalidating a county seal displayed on police
cars and other public property because of the prominent use of the cross), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct.
2890 (1986); A.C.L.U. v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d 1098 (1 lth Cir. 1983)
(cross displayed in state park held unconstitutional); Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924
(3d Cir. 1980) (city-built platform for the Pope's visit violates the Constitution), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 987 (1981); Libin v. Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393 (D. Conn. 1985) (striking a cross
displayed on a fire station at Christmas); Greater Houston Chapter of A.C.L.U. v. Eckels, 589 F.
Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (invalidating the display of three crosses in a public park); and Fox v.
City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978) (illuminated cross on
city hall violated the Constitution). The court distinguished three cases upholding cross displays:
Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 558 P.2d 338 (1976) (allowed the cross
as a traditional war memorial); Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1972) (upheld a cross
displayed at a fairgrounds among commercial activity which vitiated any benefit to religion); Paul v.
Dade County, 202 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968) (lighted
cross on county courthouse allowed because the plaintiffs omitted evidence that the cross was used to
support religion).
103. 794 F.2d at 275.

CHRISTMAS CROSS
ANALYSIS

The Seventh Circuit opinion in A. C.L. U. v. City of St. Charles is in
keeping with the dishevelled state of Supreme Court establishment clause
analysis. The circuit court had the Lemon test and five other inquiries
from which to choose. From bits and pieces of these options, the court
fashioned an involved analysis that basically decided that a cross is not a
creche. The Seventh Circuit approach in this case expands establishment
clause inquiry by freely drawing on the many methods made available by
the Supreme Court.
The circuit court did not attempt to identify any one mode of analysis as most applicable to the case at hand. Thus, many questions were
°4
asked and nearly all factors were considered relevant to the decision.
The court did not analyze the city's display under each prong of the
Lemon test, the approach taken at the district court level. Instead, the
court's core concern was the effect of the cross display. 105 The problem of
whether to read Lynch as supporting a celebratory secular purpose for
any religious symbol displayed in a holiday context was thus avoided by
0 6
avoiding the purpose inquiry altogether.'
a. HistoricalApproach
The cross's effect was evaluated in light of its particular lack of historical association with the Christmas holiday. While the Supreme
Court has relied on history to uphold a government action with an effect
which partly advances religion, it has not relied on the lack of history to
find an unconstitutional religious effect. For example, in Stone v. Graham, the Court did not even consider whether there was a history or
tradition of displaying the ten commandments in public classrooms,
although the state argued the historical significance of the command104. The Seventh Circuit did not consider the plaintiffs' contention that the record-keeping done
by the city to insure reimbursement from private volunteers was an indication of government entanglement with religion. See 622 F. Supp. at 1546-47 (district court disposed of this argument by
comparing the cross with the Lynch creche, which was owned, erected, and illuminated by the city).
105. The district court invalidated the cross display solely on religous effect grounds.
106. The district court had been troubled over whether to read the Lynch decision broadly or
narrowly. Read broadly, Lynch supports a valid secular purpose when government uses a symbol in
celebration of a holiday. Read narrowly, Lynch supports a secular purpose only when the religious
symbol is placed in a context of other secular symbols. See A.C.L.U. v. City of Birmingham, 791
F.2d 1561, 1566-67 (6th Cir.) (holding that a creche displayed on the front lawn of city hall without
secular symbols surrounding it was unconstitutional), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986). The narrow view is sometimes referred to as the "St. Nicholas too" test. Id. at 1569 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
But cf McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting the narrow approach and allowing
a creche in a public park), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nora. Board of Trustees v. McCreary,
105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
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ments. 10 7 The statute at issue was struck solely on religious purpose
grounds.
The "lack of history" argument has, however, been used by lower
courts in cases similar to the present case. In GreaterHouston Chapterof
A. C.L. U. v. Eckels, 10 8 the district court applied historical analysis and
found that since no history supported the use of crosses or Stars of David
in public parks for commemorating the war dead, the symbolic display
violated the establishment clause."° 9 In Libin v. Town of Greenwich,11
the court used the lack of historical connection between the cross and the
Christmas celebration to support its holding that the cross had no secular
purpose and had a primary effect of advancing religion. 1 1
The Seventh Circuit, like other courts, has simply recognized that
once a historical analysis is undertaken, finding a lack of history for the
practice should be given some weight in the decision. If the history of a
practice will support government use of majoritarian religious symbols,
then the lack of history should support a minority's right to have them
removed. While the Supreme Court has not recognized this ffipside of
historical analysis, it is a logical result of the method made available by
the Court. The present case may help to advance this argument.
b. Strict Scrutiny
The strict scrutiny standard was not applied to the case at hand.
The court did not look for a compelling interest and the city did not
advance one. However, the court's oblique reference to employing a
stricter application of the establishment clause, because the cross is sectarian, is based on the same underlying principle that requires strict scrutiny. The establishment clause absolutely forbids the government from
112
favoring one religious group over another.
c.

The Endorsement Test

The Seventh Circuit used the language of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test when it asked whether the cross conveyed a message of
government support for religion.1 3 However, the court did not take the
point of view of the hypothetical objective observer; rather, it looked at
107. Stone, 449 U.S. at 45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. 589 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
109. Id. at 237.
110. 625 F. Supp. 393 (D. Conn. 1985).
111. Id. at 398-400.
112. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225).
113. See Marshall, supra note 22 (general discussion of the endorsement test as a symbolic
approach).
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the cross display through the eyes of different interested persons. The
court considered how the city's Latin cross would affect Christians of
different sects and nonbelievers. 1 4 Examining the cross from the point
of view of many persons, some religious, some not, reduces the possibility
that the court's own biases will guide the result. It also eliminates the
need to guess whether the hypothetical objective observer is a Christian,
a Jew, an atheist, or none of the above. Religion is rarely an objective
subject and generally does not breed objective observers. The Seventh
Circuit approach is not only fairer but also more realistic than searching
115
the mind for the elusive objective observer.
d.

Availability of Secular Means

Justice Brennan's question, whether secular means are available,
was implicit in the court's analysis of irreparable harm, which specifically
considered that the cross could be replaced by some other Christmas
symbol. Indeed, the court expanded on the secular means inquiry by also
asking whether private means were available to accomplish the
celebratory purpose.1 1 6 The Seventh Circuit's question, whether private
means are available, would require a government to argue that any offered means would not accomplish the state's purpose. While this question was clearly applied only to the issue of whether to grant injunctive
relief, in which the balancing of harms is a necessary analytical step, it
would be no less pertinent to other establishment clause decisions.
The alternative private means question is consistent with basic establishment clause principles. If both the government and an individual
are willing to display the same religious symbol, the government should
give way. The government may not co-opt private religious expression.
Whether the court eventually extends this question to other establishment clause cases or not, currently, plaintiffs would be well advised to
advance a private alternative to government displays of religious symbols, if at all possible.
e.

Comparative Benefits

The comparative benefits approach was narrowly employed in the
114. 794 F.2d at 273 (Lutheran pastor mentioned).
115. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text discussing some of the problems of using the
objective observer standard.
116. 794 F.2d at 276. But cf McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 1984), (the court
did not consider the offer of private grounds for the creche display even though private property had
been used two years before the suit was filed), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Board of
Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
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present case. The court baldly stated that the amount of support given to
religion by the city's cross display, while not great, was greater than in
Lynch. 117 The court did not consider whether the amount of support
was greater than that of state chaplains, tax exemptions for churches, or
any other allowable support. As could be expected,1 1 8 the Lynch case
was used as the apparent yardstick for measuring allowable government
benefit to religion.
f

Areas of Expansion

Three areas of expansion are apparent. First, the historical inquiry
employed by the court asks whether the government action under review
lacks support from history or tradition. Finding a lack of historical support is relevant to a determination of unconstitutionality just as finding
historical support is relevant to holding an action constitutional. Second,
the court asks whether the action conveys a message of religious endorsement to majority believers, minority sects, and nonbelievers. Thus, the
courts asks three endorsement questions instead of the usual one, which
is based on the objective observer point of view. Finally, at least in cases
where a preliminary injunction has been requested, the court asks not
just whether secular means are available, but also whether private means
are available.
This enlarged analysis gives substance to the court's enigmatic statement that the establishment clause prohibition should be applied "more
strictly"1 9 to sectarian displays. The Seventh Circuit's questions place a
heavier burden on a government which is defending a sectarian display.
The court's historical question militates against government displays of
sectarian symbols which do not already have a strong secular tradition.
It therefore guards against new encroachments upon religious liberty.
The multiple viewpoints of the endorsement questions reject the possibility that religious liberty will depend upon majority acceptance or rejection of sectarian symbols. A government defendant will have to maintain
that the display is not offensive in the eyes of all interested persons. If
the plaintiff asserts a secular or private alternative to a government's display, the government will have to refute the assertion by showing that
the sectarian display cannot be replaced or moved and still serve the purpose. While a government's celebratory purpose will not be ques117. 794 F.2d at 273.
118. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.

119. 794 F.2d at 271.
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tioned,1

20

its choice of means to serve that purpose will have to be the

1 21
only reasonable means available.
Under the Lynch precedent, unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit approach may be applicable only to crosses or other purely sectarian symbols. The Lynch Court rejected strict scrutiny for the city sponsored
creche because the city did not have an express design to prefer one denomination over others.1 22 Insofar as the Seventh Circuit's approach approximates a strict scrutiny standard, it may be limited to crosses which
could possibly raise an inference of an express design to favor Christianity or possibly to cases coming before the court for injunctive relief.
Nevertheless, sectarian displays in the Seventh Circuit currently face
extended establishment clause analysis and stricter tests than nonsectarian displays. The court's method lays a foundation for greater government respect for religious liberty. Unless the court abandons or ignores
this foundation, the questions to be developed in future cases will be
(1) whether a certain symbol is definitely a sectarian one or a mixed sectarian and secular symbol, and (2) whether this analysis also applies to
"mixed" symbols.
CONCLUSION

The court's decision in A. C.L. U. v. City of St. Charles correctly recognizes that a cross is not a traditional Christmas symbol and therefore
cannot be displayed on government buildings as a Christmas decoration.
The court's analysis of the case is a combination and expansion of the
many inquiries available in establishment clause law. The analysis is
most notable for its implicit rejection of the objective observer point of
view. It is most innovative in its willingness to accept a private party's
offer to display the cross as a legitimate alternative to government display. The court's approach places a heavy burden on government to justify a sectarian display. The Seventh Circuit's analysis exhibits a great
respect for the principle of religious liberty for all.
BRENDA

J. ROTZ

120. The court may be adopting the broad view of Lynch and rejecting the "St. Nicholas too"
test. See supra note 105.
121. While this is certainly a heavy burden on government, it may be warranted in cases involving religious symbols. The government has no constitutional or other right to display religious symbols. The government displaying a symbol must then be relying on an interest in accommodating
free exercise of religion or, in other words, giving lawful pleasure to Christian residents.
122. 465 U.S. at 687 n.13.

